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Abstract
A quantum key distribution based on coherent state is introduced in this paper. Here
we discuss the feasibility and security of this scheme.
The cryptographic communication has a lot of important applications, particularly in the mag-
nificent prospects of private communication. As one knows, the security of cryptogrspkic channel
depends cru_ on the secrecy of the key. The Vernam cipher is the only cipher system which
has guaranteed security. In that system the key must be as long as the message ud must be
used only once. Quantum cryptography is a method whereby key secrecy can be guaranteed
by a physical law. So it is impossible, even in principle, to eavesdrop on such channels. Quan-
tum cryptography has been developed in recent years. Up to now, many schemes of quantum
cryptoSmphy have been proposed[ 1]-[8]. Now one of the main problems in this field is how to
increase transmission distance.
In order to use quantum nature of light, up to now proposed schemes all use very dim light
pubes. The average photon number is about 0.I. Because of the loss of the optical fiber, it
is difficult for the quantum cryptography based on one photon level or on dim light to realize
quantum key-distribution over long distuce.
Here we introduce a scheme of quantum cryptography based on coherent state. The average
photon number per pulse can be increased, so that we can transmit the key over longer distance.
First of all, we consider the quantum theory of the beam splitter (Fig. 1). Alice sends a
mode al which is in state lal) into the beam splitter. Bob sends a mode bl which is in state
I/_1) into the BS to measure the state sent by Alice. Suppose the output modes are as and bj,
which_e in ate I_,)and I_,)resp=e,_Jy.
According to the quantum theory of BS[9], in Helsenberg picture we have following formula:
" [ bl ]lh= [ B" Bls l [ as ] = u I al ] U+Bsls 2 s (i)
e;i -- lB;il=i÷',, 4_,- ¢_,- ÷i, - ¢_,_ f
IB.I== IB.I' - cos'0, IB,.I'= IB.I' - R' 0
Here U is Unitary Operator of the BS. cos s 8 is the reflec_on rate of the beam splitter.
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In SClL_dingerpicture, if the incoming st&re is I¢I) = lal,/is), then the output st&re i¢,)
should be
I_,) = la,,_) = U+la,,_,) (2)
U = e-iL*(÷'-÷,)e-ii_°'-'(_/')L'e -iL'(÷'+÷') (3)
Using these formula, we can in principle derive the output state for any incoming state. We axe
particularly interested in the following s/tu&tion: _
I Alice I
\
I#2>,
/ ll
FIG." 1. The basic scheme of quantum cryptography based on coherent states.
Suppose input is a coherent state ins,/_i). According to above formula, the output state is also
a coherent state as following,
I#,,)= lai <os0- B,sine,_t,_o,e+ a, sino)- la,)l_,) (l)
ai = aicosO - #i sin 0,_.i = _scos0 + ai intt
So the output state lall) depends on the eigenvalues of incoming coherent states al, _s and 0.
Here cos s 0 is the reflection rate of the besm splitter. Now we use a symmetries/beam splitter,
0 = _, and let al = a or a + 6a, Bl = a or a + 6a. In this ease, the output state las) is
Io) o, = B,In,)= I,_!6a) _,_ c,+6a,_t,=_,!- I_6a) _li a,#i = _l+ 6a
(s)
That means when AHce and Bob send the same eoEerent state, output state [ill) is vacuum
st&re 10). When they use di_erent states, Ins) will be a coherent state and its eigenvalue is
proportional to _&a. Therefore, the prob&hi]ity of detecting photon in state Ins) is given by
this expression,
0 ai : #iV,=l(nla,)l'= :tl'-l'"-_ a, _ (_)
These results ten us when Alice and Bob use the same coherent state, there is no photon to
be detected in output state i<ri). Whereas they use different coherent states, the probability of
detecting photon is not zero. Now we take the value of l&a[ is equal to _'-2. Then we get
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when al=/_l, P=-O (n>_.l)
{ 'P0=iwhen as_, p= _p,-!
n._-I -- S
That means in this case, probability of detecting no photon is 50%, and the other 50% is to
detect at least one photon.
Now Alice randomly sends a sequence of coherent states Io) or lo ÷ &o), and Bob also
randomly use the coherent states [o) or I0 + 6o) to measure the state sent by Alice
Suppose the detecting results after the transmission are shown in Tab.l,
_ice o
Bob o + 6o
detector Yes
o
Key 1
TABLE I. Key distribution using coherent states.
a
o
No
×
o+&o o+ _oa
o o + 60 0 + 60 a
Yes No No Yes
o × × o
0 0
a+6a a
a
No
×
a
o+60
No
X
After completing the transmission, Bob announces publicly the cases in which photons are
detected, but keeps secret the states he used. Alice and Bob adopt these cases as the key
distribution and translate them into a logics] 0 or 1 according to their preexitant agreement.
For example, Alice's la) represents a logics] I and Bob's [a) stands for a logics] 0. By far, we
have established a shared key distribution between Alice and Bob.
Of course, above results are in the absence of an eavesdropper. Now we consider how to find
the eavesdropper in our system if there is. Suppose there is a an eavesdropper named Eve, she
wants to split the incoming states [as) from Alice and I_) from Bob into two parts {In/,), [a_l) }
and {[_), ]_)} using her beam splitter. Then she sends states [_) and [_) to Bob, and keeps.
ste£es [¢r_ and I/_1) for her own measurement. Repeating above cs]cul&tion, we can get
= ol cos _, o_1= ol sin
 =Acos ,
Here eosS _o is the refiee_ion rate of E}ve's beam splitter. We suppose that Bob does the same
measurement as before, but in this time he receives the states Io/1) and _) at the beam splitter.
When c_t _ _, the pmb&biliW of detec'_ing photon P' is given by following expression
P' - 1 -  p{-11216al' cos' < e
Here P is the probsbiliW in the absence of an eavesdropper. Now we define s channel disturbance
parameter f as
p-p,
f= p
In order to check ff there is an eavesdropper, they can calculate the channel disturbance pa-
rameter _ after _he transmission. If they discover noticeably _ > 0, they can conclude that
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there must be an eavesdropperand discard this key distribution. In fsct, In order not to been
exposed, Eve has to make cos _o _ 1. However, in this case the probability of her detecting
photon is
1 1
P'=_
This means that Eve csa hardly get a_y information of the key between Alice sad Bob.
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